Category: Sponsorship

The Court found that the visa officer could refuse an application of a sponsorship even after an appeal being allowed by the IAD if new facts arose relevant to the application that were not considered by the IAD.

The Court set aside a decision that the applicants marriage was not genuine: [32] The Court agrees with the applicant. The Court finds that Gill, above, is directly on point. In that case, Justice Barnes cautioned the Board to be diligent in assessing the genuineness of a marriage relationship: ¶6. When the Board is required to examine the genuineness of a marriage under ss. 63(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, it must proceed with great care because the consequences of a mistake will be catastrophic to the family. That is particularly obvious where the family includes a child born of the relationship. The Board's task is not an easy one because the genuineness of personal relationships can be difficult to assess from the outside. Behaviour that may look suspicious at first glance may be open to simple explanation or interpretation. An example of this from this case involves the Officer's concern that the wedding photos looked staged and the parties appeared uncomfortable. The simple answer, of course, is that almost all wedding photos are staged and, in the context of an arranged marriage, some personal awkwardness might well be expected. The subsequent birth of a child would ordinarily be sufficient to dispel any lingering concern of this sort. Similarly, the Board's concern that Ms. Gill rushed into a second marriage can perhaps be explained by the fact that her divorce may have substantially reduced her prospects for remarriage. [33] In this case, the Board did not doubt the existence of the child – the applicant had submitted medical documents and was also obviously pregnant. The Board doubted the paternity of the child. The Court agrees with the applicant that the Board’s decision does not demonstrate sufficient reason to doubt the applicant’s testimony that her husband was the child’s father. The applicant provided evidence of the pregnancy and the due date, she also provided evidence that she was with her husband in India during the relevant time period. There was no evidence of any other relationship in which she may have been involved at the time. While it is open to the Board to doubt such things as a child’s paternity, the Board will have to provide reasons to allow both the parties and a reviewing Court to understand how it reached that conclusion. In this case, the Board’s reasons are simply that the Board does not find these witnesses to be credible. The conception of the applicant’s child coincided exactly with the time when the applicant was on her second visit to India to allegedly be with her new husband. Accordingly, the Court must conclude that the board’s reasons for doubting the paternity of the applicant’s child were not reasonable, or at least not adequately explained.

The Court found a decision that a marriage was not genuine to be unreasonable because the officer ignored evidence that pointed to the marriage and made improper findings of credibility because the inconsistencies pointed to were not significant

The court set aside a finding that an adoption was not legal holding that the tribunal erred in ignoring the expert evidence: [45] The IAD based its conclusion on its own interpretation of the Civil Code provisions and rejected any documentary evidence based on an opposing interpretation. It is entirely clear that the IAD did not understand the meaning of the legal opinions. I therefore find that, in this case, the IAD’s findings, which were based solely on its own understanding, and which failed to take into account all of the documentary evidence filed, do not fall within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes with respect to the evidence.

The court set aside a decision allowing an appeal. However, on the issue of the poison pen letter the court found no error in not giving it any weight: 26 The Minister submits that the information contained in the "poison pen letters" ought to have been given weight as the preponderance of the information was verifiable through other evidence on the record before the Board. 27 However, even though the Board is not bound by statutory evidence rules, it is reasonable for the Board to refuse to give weight to information provided in anonymous letters. The source and the motives as well as the information provided by this type of letter cannot always be verified. Therefore, the information is not necessarily trustworthy. This Court cannot find any errors in this practice of the Board and does not find that it was patently unreasonable of the Board to refuse to consider this letter in the circumstances.

The Court set aside a decision of the Appeal Division that found a marriage not genuine. The Court found that the tribunal ignored evidence and failed to provide reasons for its conclusions: I find that the evidence of both the Applicant and her Husband was consistent and provided reasonable explanations for all of the concerns the Board raised. The Board completely ignored the evidence before it and did not provide valid reasons in clear terms for its refusal of the Applicant's appeal of the Visa Officer's decision.

The Court upheld a finding there was no conjugal and only a romantic relationship. The issue was one of intention and the tribunal properly applied the factors in M. v H.

The court set aside a decision that a marriage was not genuine due to the failure of the officer to consider the documentary evidence.

The Court found no reviewable error in the conclusion by the Appeal Division that when there were credibility issues related to the genuineness of the relationship the failure of the applicant to testify could result in an adverse inference.

The Court held that the tribunal erred in attempting to go behind a valid adoption order as this was a question of foreign law. The Court set aside a decision that the adoption did not create a genuine parent child relationship relying of the following considerations; there is no evidence or suggestion that this adoption is for an improper purpose, such as child trafficking; there is medical evidence that the applicant is unable to conceive a child in Canada, and she has repeatedly tried; the applicant and her common-law husband have adopted this child because the child is the daughter of the applicant's brother, and even looks like the applicant; the applicant has been and is supporting her adopted daughter in Ghana; and the adopted daughter lives with the mother of the applicant in Ghana, and thinks the applicant is her biological mother. The Court held that “ there is evidence of a genuine mother-child relationship to the extent possible considering that they are living in different countries.”